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A Panoramic Perspective on 
Islamist Movements in the 
Middle East
Ali Bakr
Abstract This article discusses and analyses the landscape of Islamist 
movements in Egypt using a network approach, and showing where 
connections lie between different movements across North Africa. The 
article unpacks the centripetal forces that bring Islamist movements 
together in ‘uber-ideology coalitions’ and the moments where centrifugal 
forces serve to divide and splinter movements. The article challenges the 
mainstream narrative on Islamist movements and violence in two critical 
ways. First, contrary to analysts’ forecasts of a ‘post-Islamist age’, one of 
the ripple effects of the Arab Spring was the revival and proliferation of 
Islamist movements on a grand scale. Second, the article challenges the 
discourse that attributes the rise in radical militancy almost exclusively to 
the obfuscation of democratic politics through the emergence of counter-
revolutionary forces. Rather, it argues that the Arab revolts created the 
political and security environment that allowed radical Islamist movements 
to flex their muscles. 
1 Introduction
The state of  Islamism (political Islam) in Egypt is of  particular 
importance for the region and global politics. It is the birthplace of  the 
Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest and most significant Islamist movement 
to call for the establishment of  an Islamic state governed according to 
the Shariah, and from which sister movements were established across 
the world. It is also home to some of  the most well-established jihadi 
movements, which have strong links with other movements across the 
world. Finally, its geostrategic position means that it has served as a 
central node in relation to other Islamist movements in Palestine, Libya 
and North Africa and Syria. 
Many analysts and observers believed that the Arab uprisings marked 
the beginning of  the end of  religious-inspired violence, or jihad, in 
the Middle East and particularly the Arab world, believing this strain 
of  violent thought to be on its way to obsolescence (Bakr 2012a). 
It appeared to them that the peaceful Arab revolutions in Egypt, 
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Tunisia, Libya and Yemen had proved the failure of  jihadi thought, 
having achieved in such a short time what jihadi groups had failed 
to accomplish over three decades: namely, the overthrow of  Arab 
regimes. But shortly after the uprisings had toppled the regimes in those 
countries, setting loose a new wave of  jihad perhaps even fiercer than in 
the past, this analysis proved questionable. 
Conditions in the region have fostered the rise of  jihadi groups and, 
in turn, religious violence. Unlike the wave of  jihad in the 1990s, all 
indications are that the current upsurge is a long-term development 
with substantial staying power. The article argues that the positioning 
of  the Islamist movements in Egypt after the January 25 revolution of  
2011 not only affected the situation domestically, but also had spillover 
effects in Libya and Gaza, and the region more broadly. 
The article is organised as follows: the first part presents a typology of  
Islamist movements after the January 25 revolution, with a particular 
focus on three key players: (1) the Muslim Brotherhood; (2) Salafi groups; 
and (3) the jihadi and takfiri1 movements. The second parts examines 
how, following the ruptures that led to the ousting of  regimes in countries 
such as Egypt, the movements responded with flexibility to collective 
action. On the one hand, possibilities existed for post-ideological alliances; 
and, on the other, at times divisions and splinter movements became 
quite pronounced. The third part examines in more depth the various 
movements’ relationship to violence, examining in particular a number of  
dynamics: the centripetal forces that led Salafi movements to join jihadi 
movements, the factionalism that affected jihadi movements and the 
ideological regression among some movements that led them to abandon 
violence as a means of  achieving political ends. The final section (3.7) 
examines the fluidity and dynamism of  jihadi networks across borders. 
2 Typology of Islamist movements after the January 25 revolution
The typology presents the categories and self-identities used within 
Islamist movements, with the qualifier that in many cases ideological 
essence and political thought overlap, even if  they follow distinct 
organisational orders. One cannot understand religious violence after the 
January 25 revolution in Egypt without also understanding the changes 
the revolution wrought on Islamist movements. The uprising pushed 
many Islamist groups into the political process; as they sought to reach the 
seat of  governance, these movements often deviated from their hitherto 
peaceful courses of  action and took up violence to reach this goal. 
Since the January 25 revolution, the alignment of  Islamist movements 
in Egypt has shifted more quickly than ever before in their history. For 
decades, this map was static and well defined. Even allowing for the 
ideological revisionism of  groups such as the Jama’a al-Islamiya and the 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), discussed below, changes were minimal 
and gradual, allowing close study and a full understanding. In contrast, 
the most recent shifts are so rapid that it is more difficult to track them 
and identify their strategic and programmatic implications.
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2.1 The Muslim Brotherhood
The Muslim Brotherhood is by far the largest and oldest political 
Islamist organisation in Egypt, and played a leading political role after 
the January 25 revolution. The Brotherhood is also the best able to 
maintain its organisational cohesion in the face of  challenges, largely 
because members have been ideologically inoculated to contain the 
impact of  dissension. The term ‘ideological inoculation’ refers to the 
group’s inculcation of  a particular intellectual and jurisprudential 
doctrine that, for members, makes the Brotherhood synonymous 
with Islam and vice-versa. Any deviation from the group constitutes a 
deviation from Islam. 
This process of  indoctrination insulates the Muslim Brotherhood 
against the impact of  splits and schisms. The group has therefore 
produced an extensive literature that entrenches the duty of  working 
within the confines of  its community and preserves it from discord 
or division. To do this, the Brotherhood applies to itself  scriptural 
texts that enjoin the unity of  Muslims and discourage divisions in the 
community, and furthermore upholds the principle of  obedience to 
its leadership. A juridical and intellectual framework that enjoins and 
protects the larger brotherhood of  Muslims thus protects the movement 
also, and its literature valorises enduring membership and discourages 
rebelling against the group or leaving it.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s programme, teachings and literature 
are thus filled with scriptural citations that confirm the importance 
of  allegiance to the general guide and proscribe going against the 
group. The following prophetic hadiths are illustrative: ‘He who dies 
without having sworn an oath of  allegiance dies a pre-Islamic death’; 
‘God’s hand is with the community of  believers’; ‘Hear and obey, 
though you be in the charge of  an Ethiopian slave’; ‘He who obeys my 
commander has obeyed me.’ These and other texts have been employed 
in indoctrination to build the Brotherhood and ensure its continuity 
without dissension. Followers are made to believe that dissent against 
the movement is dissent against Islam itself, because the movement 
represents the faith. In practice, it makes it very difficult for followers to 
separate themselves from the movement. 
Several features distinguish the Muslim Brotherhood from other Islamist 
movements: its strong organisation, its members’ facility with politics and 
party work, and its experience with legislative elections, by which it has 
developed the ability to make partisan alliances and become adept at the 
electoral process. The Brotherhood is also able to mobilise the Egyptian 
street, a result of  long years of  outreach. Moreover, Brotherhood 
members have integrated themselves into most of  the country’s 
institutions and sectors. 
In the post-January 25 revolution stage, the Muslim Brotherhood sought 
to bring all Islamist organisations under its wing, bringing all the groups 
that had grown out of  the Brotherhood back into the fold to integrate 
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them into the organisation’s broad, popular base. Brotherhood members 
were ordered to let their beards grow long, making it difficult for the 
average person to distinguish a Brother from a Salafi and creating an 
external similarity among all Islamist groups. The Brotherhood also 
took part in rallies in Assyout, Cairo and Minya, welcoming the return 
of  the Jama’a al-Islamiya.2 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s mode of  action after the revolution 
included maintaining the secrecy of  the movement, despite the fall 
of  Mubarak’s dictatorship, refusing to compromise to resolve internal 
generational conflict, and refusing to discuss fully integrating women 
by giving them the right to compete or vote for internal positions in the 
movement, although the notion of  providing security and protection for 
the movement’s women had become obsolete. In its political practice, 
the Brotherhood chose the worst model, preserving a hierarchal 
structure, while establishing a political party as its political arm but 
without allowing it independence. The Brotherhood rejected party 
founders who were not Brotherhood members whom its leaders across 
the country had vetted, and it only offered membership to those people 
selected it had selected. This meant that the party was not a genuinely 
popular party, but rather the Brotherhood party. 
Finally, the Muslim Brotherhood allied itself  to Salafi movements and 
used them to reclaim legitimacy and build a new, massive popular base. 
It also used the Salafis to gin up fears about a rejection of  constitutional 
amendments, in particular Article 2.3 In return, the Brotherhood turned a 
blind eye to the Salafis’ actions, even adopting some of  their slogans and 
declaring that voting for the amendments was a religious duty. Members 
hung up banners to this effect in Alexandria and preached it in their 
mosques before later trying to disown these actions and confirming their 
differences with the Salafis, perhaps in response to the shocked outrage 
of  the political and cultural elite. Hence, relations with the Salafis went 
through various stages of  centrifugal and centripetal engagements. 
Immediately after the January 25 revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood 
sought alliances with the Salafis, seizing the political opportunities of  
strengthening its core constituency and the legitimacy of  the Islamist 
movements’ political platform. However, the Salafi branch that sought 
to engage in politics and formed al-Nour party resisted attempts to 
bring it into the fold, concerned that the Brotherhood would try to 
dominate all the other Islamist factions. Moreover, the Salafis became a 
political liability as elites exposed their ‘uncivil’ forms of  engagement, 
and the Brotherhood sought to distance itself  from them. 
As is shown below, the phase under the presidency of  Mohammed 
Morsi (July 2012–June 2013) saw various moments of  collaboration 
(to counter the non-Islamists), as well as times of  confrontation 
(when the Salafis felt they were insufficiently represented in power-
sharing arrangements). Periods of  collaboration and confrontation 
foreshadowed the period after Morsi’s ousting. 
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2.2 The Salafi movement (the Salafi umbrella)
The religious movements brought together under the Salafi rubric have 
many intellectual and juridical disagreements, but they are united by the 
general pillars of  Salafi thought such as holding fast to the Holy Quran 
and the Sunna (sayings and actions of  the Prophet Muhammed), purifying 
Islam of  all untrue doctrine or practices, striving for the application of  
the Shariah, the creation of  an Islamic state, and the reinstitution of  the 
caliphate in the Islamic world. The Egyptian Salafi movement, or what 
could be called the Salafi umbrella, has undergone the most radical shifts 
of  any Islamist movement since the January 25 revolution. 
Prior to January 25, the Salafis were also united by their non-participation in 
politics and party work. Indeed, some Salafi groups believed that all political 
work was prohibited, and even if  they had wished to undertake it, they could 
not have done because of  the restrictions the regime of  president Hosni 
Mubarak (1981–2011) had imposed on them. In short, there was virtually no 
political participation by Salafi movements prior to the revolution. 
Salafi movements as a whole did not initially support the January 25 
revolution and therefore did not take part in the protests and 
demonstrations in the early days. This was due to the nature of  Salafi 
ideology and thought, which prohibits rebelling against a Muslim 
ruler in any way, even through protests. When the protests escalated, 
however, individual Salafis began to take part in demonstrations. But 
Salafis who participated in the revolution did so as individuals, not as 
part of  a collective. Most Salafi sheikhs opposed the revolution and 
participation in it, and many even issued fatwas to their members. 
Gradually, however, and as the Egyptian army maintained its neutrality, 
then protected the demonstrators and refused to fire on them, some 
Salafi leaders went to the square to take part in the sit-in. They were still 
a minority, but individuals’ participation increased day by day. 
The winds of  change the revolution ushered in also touched Salafi 
movements, sparking off an intellectual revolution. Salafis soon rushed 
headlong into politics. Even those movements that prohibited political 
action and participation did not prohibit others from taking part or 
condemn them for it, and soon they too joined the political fray. Salafis 
engaged with politics from all directions, joining and creating parties, 
but their political presence was the clearest when they mobilised the 
street to vote for proposed constitutional amendments.4 
Salafi movements engaged in fierce competition against other political 
forces who opposed the amendments, mobilising all their forces: 
individuals, leaders, sheikhs, and preachers of  all stripes. It was the first 
time in the history of  the movement that it had been so involved in politics, 
and soon after the referendum, some Salafi movements began to announce 
their future plans. The EIJ announced that it had formed the Safety and 
Development Party (Al Rafat wal Tanmeya). The Jama’a al-Islamiya 
declared it too would be creating its own party, and the traditional Salafi 
movement founded al-Nour; other Salafi parties followed. 
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What is remarkable in the Salafi turn to politics is the speed of  the 
intellectual transformation involved. Such shifts usually take some 
time, but the Salafi movement transformed its position on political 
participation in a few months. In so doing, it began addressing issues 
it would never have broached in the past, given their incompatibility 
with Salafi thought and doctrine, such as citizenship, Coptic rights, the 
rule of  law, the civil state, and the regeneration of  religious discourse. 
However, Salafis’ doctrinal stances remained by and large far more 
conservative than those of, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Since the 2013 revolution, Salafism has become an umbrella movement 
that comprises innumerable Islamist groups that follow the Salafi 
programme and doctrine, abjure violence, and do not participate 
in politics, such as Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiya, the Shar’iya 
Association, and the post-revisionism of  the Jama’a al-Islamiya and the 
EIJ, as well as traditional Salafis. Indeed, in the period from 2006 to 
2010 the Salafi camp came to encompass nearly all religious movements 
in Egypt, with the exception of  the Muslim Brotherhood, some small 
takfiri groups, and the Sufi orders. 
Drawing a typology of  Salafi movements after the January 25 revolution 
is a complex endeavour due to the numerous, but overlapping schools 
of  thought. But, in general, there are two types of  Salafi movements in 
Egypt. 
Traditional Salafis
Also known as scholarly Salafis, these include Salafi schools and sheikhs 
in Alexandria, Cairo and Mansoura, as well as independent preachers 
such as Mohammed Hassan, Mohammed Hussein Yaqoub, and 
Mahmoud al-Masri. Traditional Salafis fall into three types:
(a) The Salafi Call. Growing out of  student activism in the 1970s, 
the movement took on an organised form in 1980 when young 
Salafis formed a quasi-federation for preachers; they later called 
themselves the Salafi School. After several years of  grass-roots work, 
they renamed the organisation the Salafi Call, after it spread all over 
the country and won hundreds of  thousands of  followers. They were 
also known as the Alexandria Salafis or Academic Salafis. 
(b) Movement Salafis (Ultra-Salafis). While the Salafi Call was 
establishing itself  in Alexandria, in Cairo’s Shubra neighbourhood a 
group of  young Salafis formed another movement, calling themselves 
Movement Salafis. They have virtually the same programme as 
the Salafi Call (the Alexandria School), but go further by declaring 
individual rulers unbelievers if  they do not rule by God’s revealed 
law, and they preach this in their sermons. They believe that 
participating in elected bodies is prohibited because these are 
governed by something other than God’s law and put a man-made 
constitution above God’s law, which is unbelief. These are ideas they 
held prior to the January 25 revolution. 
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(c) Independent Salafis. An extension of  the old Salafi trend in 
Egypt, represented by numerous groups and associations since the 
early twentieth century, such as the al-Hidaya Association, led by 
Sheikh Mohammed al-Khidr Hussein, which called for observance 
of  the Sunna and countering harmful innovations. Its members are 
concerned with adopting external markers of  their adherence, seen 
in clothing, beards, hair, and the headscarf. The movement does not 
believe in collective, organised action. Individual leaders became 
immersed in politics after the January 25 revolution, but not under 
an institutional umbrella. 
Salafi-oriented movements
These comprise numerous Islamist groups that are Salafi in doctrine 
and belief, but not in their organisation and operations; they have their 
own ways of  working, and independent outreach and preaching styles. 
They include:
(a) Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiya. Which has one of  the 
largest networks of  charity organisations and advocates Islam as a 
comprehensive system that governs all aspects of  life. 
(b) The Shar’iya Association. Founded in 1912 by Sheikh 
Mahmoud Khattab al-Subki as the Shar’iya Association for the 
Cooperation of  Those Working with the Quran and Muhammad’s 
Sunna, the primary objective of  the association at the time of  its 
establishment was preaching and guidance, calling for compliance 
with the Sunna and countering innovations, and supporting 
cooperation and social solidarity among the people. The association 
has 350 branches throughout Egypt. 
(c) Jama’a al-Islamiya and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The 
Jama’a al-Islamiya emerged in the 1970s in the permissive climate 
that president Anwar Sadat (1970–81) fostered. At the time, it 
comprised members of  what would later become the EIJ, which 
split from the Jama’a after 1981. The Jama’a al-Islamiya and EIJ 
engaged in a comprehensive revision of  their ideological foundations 
from 1997–2005 onwards, an experience unique to Egypt and these 
Islamist groups. With the adoption of  this revisionist thought, the 
Jama’a al-Islamiya and EIJ left the jihadi movement and joined the 
Salafi camp, being naturally inclined to the Salafi programme and 
doctrine; once they had given up the armed struggle, they became 
like other Salafi movements in Egypt. After the revolution, these 
groups experienced an ideological relapse, as they took a clear turn 
towards violence, in theory and practice, particularly after allying 
with the Muslim Brotherhood following its removal from office. 
To conclude, Salafi movements of  all kinds underwent an atypically 
rapid ideological shift, entering politics from all directions, despite 
having declared the political process illicit in the past. They did this 
without advancing any proof  of  the permissibility of  political action 
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as they had once offered hundreds of  proofs for its prohibition. This 
raises questions and doubts about the transformation, leading observers 
to believe that Salafi movements see the post-revolution phase as more 
akin to a war – and war is deception, as the hadith has it (Nasera 2011).
If  Salafis do not fight this war, they will have wasted a valuable 
opportunity to see the implementation of  Islamic law, establish an 
Islamic state, and move closer to achieving the cherished dream of  a 
greater Islamic state under the caliphate. Salafi movements may have 
joined the political process out of  what they viewed as legitimately 
exigent circumstances. This is also what led Salafi movements later to 
turn to violence; they viewed the use of  violence as a legitimate necessity, 
in much the same way that they viewed engagement with politics. 
Jihadi and takfiri organisations
A number of  jihadi groups emerged in force amid the security vacuum 
that followed the January 25 revolution. Founded in the Sinai Peninsula, 
these organisations grew and expanded during Morsi’s tenure. The 
president turned a blind eye to them, which led to an explosion of  jihadi 
activity in Sinai (Bakr 2012a). The groups are united by their goal of  
overthrowing the Egyptian regime and attacking Israel with force of  
arms. Although there are not many of  them, the groups are influential 
and can deal painful blows to the Egyptian regime and Israel. 
The takfiri groups’ thought leads them to declare society as a whole an 
infidel society. They therefore consider the ruler to be an infidel along 
with others who deny certain religious teachings. They even go so far 
as to declare anyone who does not hold the ruler to be an infidel to 
be an unbeliever. From there, they consider the general population 
to be unbelievers, seeing them as content with unbelief  or refusing 
to condemn it. Takfiri thought in Egypt is not widespread. Indeed, it 
is always in sharp conflict with society, which utterly rejects its weak 
premises and logic, its extremism, and its deviation from Egyptians’ 
generally peaceful disposition. 
Nevertheless, takfiri groups are dangerous insofar as they resort to 
violence and sanction bloodshed and attacks on property, particularly 
against what they view as infidel state institutions, Copts, and police 
and security personnel. In general, takfiri groups believe that their noble 
ends justify the means, but they cannot easily find purchase in Egyptian 
society, due to the absence of  strong organisational links between their 
members and the lack of  a hospitable location in most of  the country. 
Jihadi groups pursue violence against the ‘secular’ apparatuses 
controlling the state, to defeat them. These include groups such as Ansar 
Beit al-Maqdes, Ansar el Jihad and Jeish al-Islam. Their aspiration was 
to establish a separate emirate in Sinai by first eliminating the army and 
police presence, then taking over the judiciary and the main institutions 
of  the state as a pathway to taking over the country. A faction of  these 
groups initially opposed this plan, but after Morsi’s overthrow they 
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considered violence against the regime as a natural outcome. These 
groups espouse a takfiri ideology and believe in armed violence as a 
means of  establishing an Islamic state. They also claim that anyone who 
does do not follow their ideology is an infidel.
The relationship between jihadi groups and these apparatuses is one of  
mutual war, with each side attempting to defeat and eliminate the other 
to implement its political and intellectual project. Regardless of  jihadi 
groups’ differing programmes and political and ideological references, 
other factions, movements, or groups will always declare them non-
believers or not Islamic enough, opposing them either with violence or 
fatwas declaring them infidels. 
The most significant jihadi and takfiri groups in Egypt now, particularly 
in Sinai, are: 
(a) Al-Tawheed wal Jihad. An extremist, violent jihadi group, it 
is closer to the takfiri school than the Salafi thought most jihadi 
movements embrace (Bakr 2012b). This organisation was responsible 
for bombings in Taba and Sharm al-Sheikh in 2004 and 2006. 
Almost all its members are natives of  Sinai, and they rely on weapons 
left over from wars and other campaigns in Sinai. The group has 
maintained strong links with several Palestinian factions such as 
Jeish al-Islam (originally known as Jeish al-Fatteh) led by Mumtaz 
Daghmash. They received military training in Gaza, and many 
used tunnels to reach the Gaza Strip, where they trained in weapons 
and explosives. A few Palestinians joined the group and trained 
members to use the explosives deployed in the Sinai bombings. 
The organisation has curbed its activities substantially following an 
Egyptian security crackdown after the bombings. 
(b) Ansar Beit al-Maqdes. A jihadi, Salafi organisation, it seeks 
first and foremost to threaten the Israel and its Zionist supporters 
worldwide by various means, including bombing gas pipelines 
between Egypt and Israel and firing rockets into Israel from Sinai. The 
organisation comprises Egyptians and Palestinians, most of  whom are 
adherents to al-Qaeda’s line of  thought. The group has distinguished 
itself  through its ability to undertake successful bombings of  the 
pipeline; for example, on 9 December 2014. It has been reported that 
some Palestinian organisations maintain ties with the group and supply 
it with money and weapons, as well as expertise, advice and military 
training (Amer 2014). It is a relatively new organisation compared 
to Tawhid and Jihad. Other nationalities besides Egyptians and 
Palestinians are joining the organisation, raising numerous questions 
about the group and its emergence at this critical juncture. 
(c) Ansar al-Jihad. Ansar al-Jihad in Sinai is an al-Qaeda franchise. 
First appearing in the media after al-Qaeda announced Ayman 
al-Zawahiri’s leadership on 16 June 2011, it emerged out of  the 
Egyptian revolution and the attendant security vacuum and loss 
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of  control over Sinai. The organisation is largely composed of  
Egyptians from Sinai and other provinces, but it has been reported 
that former members of  the EIJ joined after escaping from prison 
during January 25. Ansar al-Jihad in Sinai seeks to establish an 
Islamic emirate in Sinai, with Islam the sole basis of  legislation. To 
achieve this goal, it is attempting to expel the army and police from 
Sinai and take over all security offices. It also sought to pressure the 
Egyptian government into cancelling the Camp David Accords and 
intervene to end the siege in Gaza.
Ansar al-Jihad has carried out successive bombings of  the gas pipeline 
to Israel. The group in July 2011 attempted to set fire to the second-
largest police station in Arish, when some 200 masked attackers gained 
control of  the station using advanced weapons (rocket-propelled 
grenades, grenades and automatic weapons). Army and police forces 
countered the attack – the first of  its kind in Egypt – and the clashes 
left five people dead, including one police officer and one military 
officer, and 19 seriously injured. That month the group also attacked 
the Egyptian Border Guard, and in August carried out a bomb attack 
in Eilat in southern Israel, which killed eight Israeli soldiers. 
3 Religious movements’ turn to violence in the transitional phase: causes
Several changes after the January 25 revolution clearly had an impact 
on Islamist movements’ relations with one another. These fostered 
a rapprochement between movements that in the past had strong 
disagreements, which was achieved by forging new alliances that went 
beyond doctrine and programmes of  action to become post-ideological 
alliances. These shifts also gave rise to a new strand in the Islamist 
movement – a third way – as some jihadi movements embraced 
revisionist thought and renounced violence, but without offering a clear 
picture of  the new path and programme they would pursue, which would 
enable observers to understand how they would engage with relevant or 
new issues. After the revisionist process, these movements did not join 
other existing groups (Salafi movements or the Muslim Brotherhood), 
remaining separate but without a distinct ideology to identify them. 
The most dangerous shift has been the intellectual apostasy seen in 
some movements that had embraced revisionist thought and abandoned 
violence and terrorism. Under the rise of  the Islamists, these movements 
reverted to their earlier ways, using violence, even if  somewhat covertly, in 
inflammatory speeches, though some members engaged in open violence. 
Transformations in the region have also brought some movements to 
prominence at the expense of  others. Large swathes of  Salafis in some 
areas of  the region have turned to jihadi thought. This shift outpaced the 
migrations from the jihadi camp to the Salafi camp, which had taken a 
substantial period of  time, indicating perhaps that the turn to violence is 
easier in the region than the turn away from it. The jihadi umbrella also 
benefitted from the rise to prominence of  al-Qaeda in the region after 
the Arab revolts, in particular al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
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and Ansar al-Din, and in East Africa al-Tawheed wal Jihad. Other 
Salafi movements in the region joined them, especially from Mauritania, 
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. The dominant voice began to 
shift from Salafi circles to more jihadi ones, as was the case in Tunisia. 
In Egypt this was also apparent in the Salafi discourse around the time 
of  the 2011–12 elections, when former vice-president and head of  the 
intelligence service Omar Suleiman5 stood for president and members of  
the Jama’al-Islamiya threatened him with violence if  he ran for office.
A significant consequence of  these shifts is the sharp divisions they 
have created in the ranks of  jihadi organisations across the region. 
Jihadi groups have witnessed so many splits in their ranks that divisions 
have become an endemic feature. One jihadi group may split into two 
independent groups because of  disagreements and soon enough each 
new group is plagued by its own divisions, leading to a proliferation 
of  organisations. The fragmentation within the ranks of  the jihadi 
movements is due to several factors, the most important of  which is the 
power of  influential leaders who gain popularity among the people to 
convince them to split from the mother movement. 
The reasons for this are differences in thought and ideology. For 
example, if  within the movement a group emerges that considers there 
to be a deviance in thinking that needs addressing and the leadership 
refuses on the basis that it is unchangeable, a splinter emerges. This 
explains the emergence of  groups such as Ansar al-Jihad, Majles Shura 
al-Mujahedeen, Ansar Beit al-Maqdes, Jeish al-Islam and al-Tawheed 
wal Jihad. It creates an air of  competitiveness among the different 
splinter groups rather than complementarity, as each group tries to show 
the rest that it is more active and more ‘jihadist’ than the others. This 
splintering not only means that acts of  violence occur more often, but 
that it is more difficult to enter into negotiations because they will not 
necessarily agree on the same position, and representatives of  one group 
may not be entitled to speak on behalf  of  other groups. It also means it 
is more difficult to control them. 
3.1 Post-ideological alliances
Political Islam emerged after the fall of  the caliphate in 1924 with the 
founding of  the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, followed by the birth of  
other movements. Since then a state of  hostility has prevailed among 
these groups due to ideological and doctrinal differences, which at times 
has led some groups to declare others infidels. Often these movements 
have waged fierce battles against one another, particularly among the 
three main Islamist camps in the region: Salafi movements, jihadi 
movements and the Muslim Brotherhood. 
The enmity between Islamist groups is stronger than their enmity 
towards non-Islamists because it is based on doctrinal disagreements, 
each movement seeing itself  as the possessor of  the absolute truth and 
the true representative of  Islam, with the others as distorted versions 
of  Islam. The latter are thus more dangerous to Islam than liberal or 
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nationalist movements, which do not claim to be Islamic. Battles with 
non-Islamists are not difficult; they can easily be defeated by turning 
the dispute into a religious battle. But other Islamist movements wear 
the same cloak of  religion and speak the same language, with the same 
logic; they are therefore a much more formidable enemy because they 
use the same weapons. 
After the Arab revolutions, however, many Islamist movements drew 
closer together, and formed strong alliances, despite sharp ideological 
differences. These were post-ideological alliances, partnerships that 
disregarded ideological differences to achieve common interests. 
‘Coalitions above ideology’ were formed because movements found 
that when pressed, political and financial interests require joining forces 
irrespective of  ideological differences. 
One of  the most well known of  these alliances was the National 
Coalition to Support Legitimacy, which was announced on 27 June 2013, 
three days before the 30 June uprising. The Coalition brought together 
the Muslim Brotherhood, the Jama’a al-Islamiya, remnants of  the EIJ, 
and several Salafi movements as well as political parties.6 The Coalition 
is significant because it brought together various political forces who had 
major ideological differences with the Muslim Brotherhood. 
In addition, an alliance was created between the Muslim Brotherhood 
and some jihadi and takfiri organisations in Sinai, which had previously 
declared the Brotherhood and Morsi to be infidels, adding that there 
was no difference between Morsi and Hosni Mubarak: both were 
unbelievers who did not rule by God’s law. 
These alliances were based on common interests that went beyond 
ideological tenets. Islamist movements recognise two types of  
differences, those that are unbridgeable and those that allow for a 
diversity of  opinion. The first type precludes any alliance or even 
cooperation between the two differing groups, while the second does 
not. In general, the disagreements between allied movements were of  
the first type, for they were primarily based on ideological and doctrinal 
disputes. To achieve their common interests, however, these movements 
disregarded doctrine to conclude a post-ideological alliance. 
These alliances played an important role in feeding the violence in 
Egypt in the transitional period. They put all movements on the same 
side as violent jihadi groups, joining together to support the Muslim 
Brotherhood. While the jihadi movements played a larger role in the 
violence, other allied movements supported and aided them, which had 
not been the case in the past. Given this support, the violence of  jihadi 
groups was even more extreme. The Brotherhood managed to create 
these alliances for the first time in the history of  Islamist movements by 
allowing the presence of  militant groups in Sinai, and turning a blind 
eye to their access to funding and arms, in return for their supporting 
the Brotherhood in office and defending it. 
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The post-June 2013 situation indicates that these alliances are spreading. 
Islamist movements have discovered that post-ideological alliances are 
the shortest path for the biggest gains, leading them to place interests 
and political and material benefits above doctrinal and ideological 
principles. Examples include AQIM, which has included a number 
of  Salafi groups that were previously enemies. This suggests that the 
network of  such alliances may spread in the coming period, which will 
have serious ramifications for the entire region.
3.2 The Muslim Brotherhood and the turn to violence
The Muslim Brotherhood is fundamentally a political, religious 
outreach organisation that relies primarily on public action, and it is 
therefore unlikely that the Brotherhood will go entirely underground. 
The danger, instead, is that it will establish a secret apparatus to 
undertake violent operations the organisation does not wish to claim, 
much like the secret organisation it established in the past. This move 
carries many risks, however, and in the past had dire repercussions 
for the group. The Brotherhood appears to have realised this and is 
therefore unlikely to take this step, especially when it has an alternative: 
namely, relying on the jihadi organisations with which it has allied itself, 
especially during Morsi’s presidency, as well as depending on Hamas. 
As the revolution moved forward, the Brotherhood and its Islamist 
allies were thrown off balance and rushed towards violence. They 
began by threatening and attacking opposition demonstrations, but 
then took several confused steps to address the crisis. The non-Islamist 
movements’ ability to mobilise such large groups of  people caught them 
by surprise, and the Brotherhood leadership found it difficult to agree 
on the best course of  action to take. Some called for a general jihad as 
the only way to prevent Morsi’s overthrow, others for peaceful protests 
to ensure that the movement’s projected commitment to non-violent 
democratic engagement was upheld. 
In the end, they pursued a number of  sometimes apparently 
contradictory tactics. For one, they mobilised their supporters in force 
in an attempt to balance out opposition forces, portraying matters to 
their supporters as a conflict between Islam and secularism, while trying 
to present the battle on the ground internationally as a coup against 
legitimacy. Mobilisation was in full force, bringing supporters from 
Upper Egypt, the Delta and all over Cairo, assembling in Nahda Square 
to coincide with pro-Morsi demonstrations in several governorates. This 
came after the Brotherhood issued a ‘general alert’ to defend legitimacy. 
At these demonstrations, supporters brandished clubs and bladed 
weapons, and performed military exercises to terrorise citizens. This was 
a clear sign of  impending violence (Ghoneam 2013).
In this charged atmosphere, when demonstrators attempted to 
storm the Brotherhood headquarters in Muqattam the Brotherhood 
responded with violence. Eight demonstrators were killed in the clashes 
and 70 more injured (Al-Arabiya 2013). They captured a Brotherhood 
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sniper, who said that 250 people were on top of  the headquarters 
armed with shotguns and automatic weapons. On the evening of  2 July, 
the Brotherhood sent out armed groups in the capital to attack local 
residents, in an attempt to sow violence and foment unrest in various 
areas of  Cairo and the governorates. The objective was to prompt Gen. 
Abdel Fatah el-Sisi, the head of  the armed forces, to retract his decision 
and keep Morsi in office, out of  fear of  sparking off a civil war. Sit-ins at 
Rabia al-Adawiya and Nahda Squares also brought violence with them. 
After protesters refused to leave the squares, security forces used force 
to disperse them, which led to violent confrontations on 14 August; 
632 people killed, including eight police officers, 1,492 injured, and 
around 800 arrested. The National Council for Human Rights pointed 
out that while protesters had fired first, the police’s response was 
excessive and out of  proportion (ahramonline 2014).
The crisis was the worst the Muslim Brotherhood had experienced in its 
long history. For the first time, it found itself  out in the cold because of  
its use of  violence. Long accustomed to confrontation with the state, the 
Brotherhood had derived a sense of  victimhood and persecution, and it 
was one of  the primary reasons that many Egyptians sympathised with it.
Although the crisis proved too big for the leadership and its capacities, 
the Muslim Brotherhood maintained its organisational cohesion, 
because it was protected ideologically in the minds of  its members. 
The Brotherhood has a singular ability to maintain internal cohesion 
and counter divisions because its thought has focused on equating 
the group with Islam and vice-versa in the minds of  its members. It 
draws on Quranic verses and hadiths that prohibit going against the 
larger community of  Muslims, and applying these texts to themselves, 
thereby leading individual Brothers to believe that deviating from the 
Brotherhood’s teachings is tantamount to deviating from Islam. 
In addition to this internal cohesion, the Muslim Brotherhood enjoys 
sympathy among sections of  the people, especially in Upper Egypt. 
Nevertheless, its turn to violence has given rise to several severe crises. 
First of  all, it can no longer mobilise support as in the past due its 
declining popularity in the street, particularly in the Delta. This has 
become apparent in the poor attendance at Brotherhood demonstrations 
since the June 2013 revolution, many of  which numbered only in the 
hundreds. Moreover, its organisational performance has been weakened 
by the arrest of  active leaders who could make important and strategic 
decisions, leaving the leadership to those unable to deal with current 
challenges. This has led to haphazard decision-making and an inability 
to define a clear vision for the current phase. 
Finally, although the cohesion that has been built into the Muslim 
Brotherhood over its long history makes it unlikely that that the group 
will collapse or fragment into smaller entities, circumstances since 
mid-2015 may have a greater impact and foster increased divisions in 
the group’s ranks. The Brotherhood suddenly finds itself  confronting 
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millions of  Egyptians after taking up violence to achieve its goals, 
contradicting three decades of  claims to have definitively renounced 
violence. Internally, a leadership struggle is taking place. Many young 
members would like to challenge the movement’s leaders, but are 
waiting until the current crisis passes. 
Any predictions about the future of  the Muslim Brotherhood, and how 
to engage with it or integrate it into society therefore depend on the 
consequences the current crisis has for the organisation and if  it resorts 
to the use of  further violence. In any case, the cost of  surviving the crisis 
of  violence will be very high indeed. 
3.3 Third way movements
Since the late 1990s, the Arab region has seen a wave of  unique 
ideological transformations, as numerous jihadi movements renounced 
violence in what became known as the revisionist wave.7 Thousands 
of  former jihadis or their sympathisers turned away from jihadi 
thinking and were persuaded of  the failure of  the jihadi enterprise the 
movements promoted. These transformations were a process of  self-
criticism aimed at these organisations’ former concepts and ideological 
assumptions, as well as the practices that accompanied them, and it 
involved establishing new ideological foundations and priorities that 
differed from the previous priorities and inevitabilities (Fiqqi 2010).
The movements that engaged in this process were thus left without 
an identity. That is, they had no particular intellectual orientation or 
defining features that would permit one to identify their ideological 
underpinnings. In turn, it became difficult to categorise them among 
the major Islamist movements in the region – the Muslim Brotherhood 
and the Salafi trend – because when they abandoned their old ideas as 
part of  the revisionist process, they did not adopt a new way of  thinking 
that could ground them or define their programme and objectives. They 
thus became ‘third way’ groups of  unknown identity and indeterminate 
ideas, which raised many questions about their aims and future. 
Several organisations in the region underwent this process, holding 
no distinct ideological features, most notably the Egyptian Jama’a 
al-Islamiya. The group unilaterally declared a ceasefire in 1997 
before announcing a wholesale revision of  its thought, conduct and 
organisational structure in 2002; the Jama’a eventually produced 
25 books detailing the revisionist process. It was followed by the EIJ, 
some of  whose leaders began the revisionist process in prison, led by 
Sayyed Imam al-Sherif, the author of  The Document to Rationalize the 
Jihad in Egypt and the Islamic World and The Exposure.8 Despite the general 
support for the revisions within the EIJ in Egypt, the group was not as 
successful in its transformation as the Jama’a al-Islamiya, with some 
leaders outside Egypt continuing to reject the entire process. After the 
revisions, the Jama’a al-Islamiya and EIJ became third way movements 
because they had not offered any alternative programme of  thought 
(Al-Khateeb 2008).
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The danger third way movements pose is that they have no specific 
identity or clear intellectual framework that would permit an 
understanding of  their current orientation and future plans, particularly 
because movements such as the Jama’a al-Islamiya and EIJ have become 
clearly opportunistic, power-hungry organisations, looking for political 
and economic gains by any means. Without an ideological framework 
to govern their actions, they wait for the moment to ally themselves 
with another movement that will enable them to achieve these gains. 
Moreover, some have resumed their use of  violence, among them 
members of  the Jama’a and EIJ. Indeed, another danger of  third way 
movements is that they are liable to (re)turn to violence at any moment.
3.4 Ideological apostasy
In the wake of  the relatively peaceful Arab uprisings, many researchers 
believed that jihadi movements in the region were on the wane, 
especially because the uprisings were preceded by the revisionist process 
undertaken by many jihadi movements, starting in Egypt with the 
Jama’a al-Islamiya and followed by the EIJ, the Islamic Fighting Group 
in Libya, the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front, several Salafi movements 
in North Africa (particularly Mauritania), and leaders of  al-Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula. 
A the beginning of  the Arab Spring, several former jihadi movements 
that had embraced revisionist thought engaged with the political 
process, which they had previously boycotted and declared prohibited. 
In Egypt, jihadi movements vied to establish new political parties, with 
the Jama’a al-Islamiya forming the Construction and Development 
Party, and the EIJ creating the Safety and Development Party.
Despite the move to renounce violence and enter the political fray, 
an ideological relapse or retreat has been evident. Some of  these 
movements have begun to reconsider the bases of  the revisionist 
thought that led to their renunciation of  violence, such as the 
prohibition on taking up arms and rebelling against the ruler. Jama’a 
al-Islamiya leaders in Egypt, for example, allowed taking up arms in 
self-defence against an unjust ruler and to rebel against him. Members 
of  these movements again took part in violence. Many members of  
al-Qaeda in Sinai (Ansar al-Jihad) are thought to be former members 
of  the EIJ, and Jama’a al-Islamiya leaders appealed to the Egyptian 
government during the uprising in Libya against Muammar Gaddafi to 
permit the group’s youth wing to join fighting there. 
This act of  ideological apostasy by jihadi groups opened the door to 
the return of  violence, which soon began to grow out of  control and 
has contributed to a spike in religious violence in the country, which 
has manifested itself  in attacks on Coptic Christians, churches and 
Sufi shrines. In fact, in 2016 two types of  jihadi movement exist. The 
first, including the jihadi organisations scattered across the Sinai, are 
those in the region that continue to practise armed violence and seek 
to use it achieve their objectives. The second group, however, is more 
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problematic and more dangerous: jihadi movements that engage in 
armed violence after having embraced revisionist thought. We are thus 
faced with a wave of  religious violence due to this ideological apostasy 
that is spreading day by day. 
3.5 The shift from Salafi thought to jihadi thought
The shift from Salafi to jihadi thought is one of  the most dangerous 
seen in Islamist movements since the Arab revolutions, particularly in 
Egypt during the transitional period. Jihadi movements in the region 
have expanded into a ‘jihadi umbrella’ at the expense of  what used to 
be the largest Islamist umbrella movement prior to the Arab Spring, the 
Salafis. The Salafis had expanded when several jihadi groups turned to 
the Salafi programme of  action and ideas based on religious outreach, 
disseminating the faith, the oneness of  God, a desire for religious 
knowledge, and an absolute prohibition on armed struggle. Indeed, 
non-violence is the most significant feature that distinguishes the Salafi 
movement from the jihadi movement. 
The shifts within the Jama’a al-Islamiya and the EIJ after the revisions 
were the most renown expression of  the move from the jihadi to the 
Salafi umbrella. After the January 25 revolution, however, a shift in 
the opposite direction took place, as Islamists moved out of  the Salafi 
camp and into the jihadi camp. This move was rapid, far outpacing the 
gradual transformation from jihadi to Salafi. This indicates that the turn 
to violence might be much easier than the turn to peace. 
When al-Qaeda in Sinai emerged, it attracted numerous Salafis to its 
ranks. Jihadi movements such as the Jama’a al-Islamiya and EIJ that 
had embraced revisionism also began to change their rhetoric after 
January 25, moving closer to a jihadi discourse. Indeed, from time to 
time, Jama’a al-Islamiya warned of  its potential to take up violence 
again (for example, as mentioned above, when Omar Suleiman 
announced that he would run for president). Many Salafis also turned 
to violence, reflected in the demolition of  shrines in numerous areas and 
attacks on Coptic churches. 
Increased jihadi activity at the expense of  Salafi activity has 
repercussions for the region. It has grave security consequences: 
jihadis have successfully carried out major operations that threaten 
the security of  entire countries and their territorial integrity by taking 
control of  certain regions and imposing their rule, as was the case in 
Sinai immediately after Morsi’s overthrow. They can also inflict major 
casualties in the ranks of  those fighting them. Attacks lead to capital 
flight and impede production; some directly target tourism in areas 
where it is vital to the local economy. Moreover, state facilities have been 
attacked and destroyed,9 entailing major economic losses.
At the same time, these groups’ activities have serious political 
ramifications, insofar as they aim to overthrow all regimes in all states 
in the region, including those that describe themselves as Islamic, with 
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the goal of  establishing a caliphate through jihad and armed action. 
Meanwhile, the relationship between the jihadi and Salafi camps is 
inversely proportional: when one grows, the other shrinks. Current 
conditions indicate that the jihadi camp is expanding at an exponential 
pace, which may have serious consequences for religious violence in Egypt. 
3.6 Jihadi factionalism
Immediately before the Arab revolutions, jihadi groups across the 
region were on the retreat, and virtually none were active in Egypt. 
Paradoxically, the Arab Spring, a series of  peaceful uprisings that were 
thought to mark the beginning of  the end for jihadi movements in the 
region – and maybe the world – actually inaugurated a new jihadi wave, 
stronger and more active than the wave of  the 1990s. Subsequently, 
however, jihadi movements experienced numerous splits in their ranks, 
to the point that factionalism has become a defining feature of  the 
movement. For example, following the Arab Spring, al-Tawheed wal 
Jihad emerged out of  AQIM in 2011, and then ‘tanzim al mouq’eoon 
bel dema’a’, which came into being in December 2012, led by former 
AQIM leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar. Also to splinter off from AQIM is 
Ansar al Shari’a in Yemen which became an independent movement 
with its own ideological and tactical features. Meanwhile, in Egypt 
Ansar Beit al-Maqdes split from Ansar al-Jihad, and Kat’aeb al Forqan 
subsequently split from Ansar Beit al-Maqdes. 
Divisions occur in jihadi ranks for various reasons, but the most 
significant factor is the presence of  an influential figure who attracts 
followers, which leads to a schism, having persuading those around him 
to break off from the parent organisation. The causes of  division can be 
ideological or doctrinal. One group in an organisation may believe that 
some doctrinal shortcoming must be addressed, while the leadership 
does not deem it a shortcoming, believing that doctrinal frameworks are 
sacrosanct. In turn, the dissenting faction splits off with a new ideology, 
usually composed of  the old body of  thought with a layer of  new ideas, 
under a new leadership. 
Divisions may also occur for political reasons. One faction may believe 
that it will not achieve its political interests inside the organisation and 
therefore splits off to pursue these interests. Personal factors also play 
a role. Someone who aspires to leadership may see this as his natural 
place, from which he will carry out major operations that the current 
leadership cannot. He therefore breaks off and establishes a new group, 
setting himself  up as leader and attempting major operations, to prove 
to others that he is worthy of  the leadership and was right to splinter off. 
Factionalism will have major negative consequences and lead to an 
increase in religious violence. Relations among jihadi groups in general, 
and particularly splinter groups, are competitive: when one jihadi 
group undertakes an operation, another (splinter) group will attempt 
an even bigger operation to prove that its members are more devoted 
and fervent supporters of  Islam and the jihad. Factionalism also leads 
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to the proliferation of  jihadi organisations, making it difficult to control 
or negotiate with them, or even bring them together to agree on a 
position. This in turn makes it difficult to engage with and confront 
these organisations in the short and long term. The greater the number 
of  splinter groups, the greater the proliferation of  acts of  terrorism and 
violence. 
3.7 Regional ripple effects
Three types of  Jihadi movements are present in the region that have 
become particularly active since the Arab Spring, most of  which 
subscribe to al-Qaeda’s thinking. The first is the ‘mother’ movement 
itself, al-Qaeda, which Osama Bin Laden established in 1988 under the 
name of  ‘the Islamic international front for jihad against the Jews and 
Crusaders’. It formed out of  a number of  jihadi forces in various parts 
of  the world, and focused its activities on Pakistan and Afghanistan. The 
second are branches of  al-Qaeda that were formed under Bin Laden’s 
direct instruction. These include al-Qaeda in Gaziret al Arab, which is 
active in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. While some extend their ideological 
thinking from the mother movement, they are organisationally separate 
and do not get their directions or instructions from al-Qaeda. The third 
type comprises groups that looked to al-Qaeda as a model for jihadi 
activism, and follow its ideological thinking and way of  organisation, 
but are not formally linked to al-Qaeda, either the mother movement or 
its offshoots, and were not formed by Bin Laden. These include Ansar 
al-Jihad, AQIM, Jama’at Ansar al-Jihad in Sinai and al-Qaeda fi bilad 
al Rafedeen in Iraq. 
The map of  jihadi movements in the Middle East has changed since the 
Arab revolts. The fall of  the security apparatus in countries in the midst 
of  chaos, the relaxation of  many states’ border patrols, the circulation 
of  weapons, humans and resources have enabled such movements to 
thrive in the Arab world. Many of  these organisations recognise that 
this is a moment in the region’s history that has afforded them the 
opportunity to spread and strengthen ties between one another, with a 
view to establishing an Islamic caliphate based on a model of  forming 
Islamic emirates in land they occupy, as with attempts at establishing 
Islamic emirates in the south of  Sinai, in Tunisia, in Yemen, in Iraq and 
the north of  Mali. This has resonance from one country to another, 
with ripple effects. The growth of  the jihadi movement in Egypt after 
the January 25 revolution had a ripple effect in activing movements 
elsewhere. Likewise, the regional crisis that has grown out of  Syria, 
and the situation of  jihadi movements in the region, influences the 
positioning of  the jihadi movement in Egypt. What we see is the 
emergence of  an situation that is very much conducive to the growth 
and strengthening of  networks of  jihadi groups everywhere. 
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Notes
1 Those who assume ‘takfiri’ thought hold others who do not espouse 
their version of  Islam to be infidels, even if  they are Muslim and 
members of  Islamist movements. In the eyes of  members of  takfiri 
movements, it is legitimate to kill people and take their wealth if  they 
are declared to be kafir (infidel).
2 From insider information, it appeared that the Muslim Brotherhood 
looked favourably on the rallies that the Jama’a al-Islamiya held 
in February 2013 in support of  the Brotherhood and the current 
administration.
3 Article 2 of  the Egyptian constitution since 1977 has stated that 
‘the principles of  Islamic Sharia are the main source of  legislation.’ 
Before the 1977 amendment to the constitution, Article 2 stated that 
‘the principles of  Islamic Sharia are a main source of  legislation’. 
Following the January 25 revolution, a controversy erupted about 
whether ‘secularists’ wanted to revert to the pre-1977 formulation 
in a new constitution, which would in effect dilute the centrality of  
Islamic Sharia in governance and legislation.
4 These included easing of  the conditions of  eligibility for a presidential 
candidate, full judicial oversight over the presidential elections and 
clear articulation of  the processes representing a roadmap.
5 He was also in charge of  negotiations between the regime and the 
Muslim Brotherhood during Mubarak’s presidency.
6 These include the Labour Party, the Reform Party, the Watan Party, 
Arab Unity Party, Raya Party and Islamic party.
7 The revisionist wave encompassed the Jama’a al-Islamiya. In a 
number of  publications, the jihadists denounced violence – but 
not necessarily in favour of  political activities. This ideological 
revisionism continued up to the January 25 revolution. Subsequently, 
some of  these movements appear to have reversed their positions on 
violence, as speeches of  the late Essam And el Maged and Tarek el 
Zomor, leaders of  the Jama’a al-Islamiya, reflected. 
8 These documents are of  paramount importance to revisionist 
thinking on jihad.
9 See, for example, www.masress.com/alwafd/621466 .
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